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Abstract. What is the growth rate of population that maximizes fatalities from the terrorist 
incidents? This is a fundamental problem in studies of terrorism and political violence. The 
paper confronts this question here by analyzing demographic and socioeconomic factors 
causing and sustaining terrorism in society. Firstly, the present study suggests non-linear 
effects between confirmed fatalities for terrorist incident and rates of growth of population. 
Secondly, empirical analyzes and optimization reveal that a growth rate of population of 
about 3.6% maximizes the lethality due to terrorist incidents in society. This high growth 
rate of population associated with terrorism is in some problematic regions such as Iraq, 
Mali, Sudan, etc. Overall, then, the ethnicity and/or religion are illusory causes of terrorism, 
because they are not an environmental stressor per se. Instead, a distal cause of terrorism 
may be a critical demographic mass and high population growth that, in combination with 
socioeconomic issues and political instability, can induce terrorism as a result. Finally, 
some socioeconomic policies are suggested to enhance conditions of people to reduce this 
social issue over the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
his paper has two goals. The first is to show the relationship between growth 
rates of population and effects of terrorism. The second is to analyze the 
growth rate of population that can support terrorism in regions with social 
issues and to suggest policies of growth that ameliorate conditions of people and 
indirectly reduce the socioeconomic causes of terrorism. These topics are basic 
problems in society because the terrorism has increased in the last decades both in 
advanced and developing nations (Coccia, 2018, 2018a; Editorials Nature, 2015; 
Reardon, 2015; Norris et al., 2013; Rosendorff & Sandler, 2005; Li & Schaub, 
2004). In particular, Americans have been targeted in about 25% of terrorist 
incidents during the past 20 years (Linstone, 2003, p.289; cf., Park & Bali, 2017, 
p.1). Although many predictors of terrorism are often unclear factors (Krueger & 
Malečková, 2009), some sources of terrorism are explained with economic factors 
(Enders et al., 2016; Blomberg et al., 2004, 2004a), political factors (Coggins, 
2015), social factors (Schaafsma & Williams, 2012), etc. However, how 
demographic factors in certain regions cause and sustain terrorism are hardly 
known. This study endeavors to explain some research questions: What is the 
growth rate of population that supports the terrorism in regions with social issues? 
And Why? The underlying problem of these research questions is to explain the 
situational factors of terrorism in problematic society. The study here confronts this 
scientific problem applying statistical analyses and optimization methods to clarify 
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whenever possible, one of the causing factors that supports terrorism in society. 
Findings here can also support long-run economic policies directed to reduce 
demographic and socioeconomic stress that leads to terrorism in specific regions. 
In order to position this analysis in the field of terrorist studies, next section begins 
by briefly reviewing the literature and by developing the theoretical framework of 
this contribution.  
 
2. Theoretical background and framework 
Crenshaw (1981, p.380) argues that terrorism is the systematic inducement of 
fear and anxiety to control and direct a civilian population. In particular, 
“Terrorism is an attractive strategy to groups of different ideological persuasions 
who challenge a nation's authority… to dramatize a cause… to gain popular 
support, to provoke regime violence, to inspire followers” (Crenshaw, 1981, 
p.389). Ackoff & Rovin (2003, p.144) claim that terrorism is “violence against 
innocent”. Terrorism can be described by four characteristics: violence, non-
combatant targets, a desire for power, and the need to attract attention, send a 
message, or provoke an extreme response (Linstone, 2003, p.289). Coates (1996, 
p.298) claims that a terrorist threat exists when, there must be an issue, there must 
be some group organized and with a purpose related to that issue and the terrorist 
group must have the technical skills to carry out a terrorist action for a political 
purpose. Linstone (2007, p.115) identifies a current wave of terrorism, from 1970s 
to 2020s and argues that terrorism is a form of warfare that violates the conventions 
of conduct developed in wars between states (cf., Ball, 2005; Schuurman & 
Horgan, 2016; Rapoport, 2004). In this context, Devezas & Santos (2006), by 
fitting over 10,000 terrorist incidents since 1961 to a logistic growth curve, argue 
that current period is only at the very low stage of development of terrorism and 
that an inflection point will be reached at 2030s or thereabout.  
Several studies endeavor to clarify the direct and indirect factors of terrorism 
(Newman, 2006; Abadie, 2005). Crenshaw (1981, p.381) claims that it is important 
for terrorism to separate between preconditions (factors that set the stage for 
terrorism over the long run) and precipitants (specific events that precede the 
occurrence of terrorism). Some preconditions of terrorism are economic factors, 
such as poverty, inequality, etc. (Newman, 2006; Ezcurra & Palacios, 2016). 
Ackoff & Rovin (2003, p.146) argue that: “countries that are the breeding grounds 
for terrorists are the least advanced economically”. Enders et al., (2016) observe 
that domestic and transnational terrorist attacks are more concentrated in middle-
income countries and the point of concentration is shifted to lower income 
countries after the rising influence of the religious fundamentalist. Some studies 
show that poverty, inequality and large numbers of young men facing dim 
economic prospects, also are likely contributors to terrorism (Ehrlich & Liu, 2002; 
Coccia, 2017, 2018). Other studies of terrorism analyzepolitical factors, such as 
government repression, human rights violation, state failure, etc. (Abadie, 2005; 
Coggins, 2015; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011). Causes of terrorism are also due to 
social factors, such as low levels of education, etc. (Choma et al., 2016; van Berger 
et al., 2015; Burgoon, 2006). Schaafsma & Williams (2012, p.829) argue that 
social exclusion and rejection among ethnic minority and majority members lead to 
increased intergroup hostility and stronger fundamentalist religious beliefs. This 
religious fundamentalism has the capacity to disrupt the stability of society and to 
generate violence and terrorism (cf., Butler, 2015).   
In general, terrorism is growing worldwide and it is essential to understand why 
this is happening in order to defuse the underlying causes. Piazza (2006, p.463) 
shows that: “variables such as population, ethno-religious diversity, increased state 
repression and, most significantly, the structure of party politics are found to be 
significant predictors of terrorism”. In particular, demographic issues are a critical 
factor for understanding the relation between different socioeconomic contexts and 
terrorism (Piazza, 2006; Parsons, 1991). Scholars show that high population 
density and population growth can lead to resource scarcity and violence (Christens 
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& Speer, 2005; Lee, 2016, 2016a; cf., Christian, 1961). The theoretical background 
of these studies is the theory of Malthus (1817[1798]) presented in the book An 
Essay on the Principle of Population where Malthus wrote that population has 
geometric growth rates, while food subsistence has arithmetic (lower) growth rates. 
This imbalance of growth rates between population and natural resources creates a 
looming crisis and environmental conflicts. In fact, Malthus (1817[1798]) is the 
first scholar to analyze the socioeconomic problems of high growth rates of 
population that generate scarcity of resources and are a “future cause of strife” 
(Lee, 2016). Several scholars are current proponents of neo-Malthusian approaches 
in different research fields to explain economic phenomena and social issues of 
nations, such as Ehrlich (1968) that foretold a coming crisis from overpopulation 
and limited resources. Kaplan (2000) argues a possible threat to rich nations 
because of population increase in poor countries. This research field supports the 
thesis that high growth rates of population, combined with scarce environmental 
resources, can lead to conflicts and violence. In fact, Lee (2016) claims that: “Overt 
violence is site-specific with ties to local relationships and histories, but the larger 
process of material transformation and power relations plays a crucial role”. 
Visaria (1989) argues that one of the most serious consequences of the acceleration 
of population growth is the difficulty of generating adequate employment 
opportunities for the growing labor force within poor nations (cf., Keyfitz, 1993). 
Cassils (2004) claims that the poorest regions of the world, where population 
growth is still rapid, will continue to suffer the most and face decreased life 
expectancy through resource depletion, conflict, and disease. Abernethy (1993, 
p.417) confirms these results adding that: “rapid population growth causes 
poverty.... fundamentalism and hate may become more likely when people's 
expected standard of living is slipping away, beyond control… religious 
fundamentalism and violence appear together ... to thrive alongside the spread of 
poverty and unemployment” (cf., Lemsine, 1992). In short, the imbalance between 
population and economic resources in specific regions can cause problems of 
violence that revolve around issues of power rather than scarcity of resources 
(Peluso & Watts, 2001). In particular, overpopulation and social issues have 
several interconnections that can lead to a growing insecurity worldwide (Cassils, 
2004, p.172). In this context, Linstone (2003, p.288, original emphasis) argues that: 
“The world population is expected to increase from 6.2 billion to 9.3 billion in 
2050 and 98% of this growth will be in the poorer countries… billions of frustrated 
and angry individuals … eager to find release in terrorism”. In addition, Ehrlich & 
Liu (2002, p. 188) observe that:  
high population growth rates are expected to continue in many developing 
nations, with a projected annual growth rate for people aged 20–34 of 2.82% as 
opposed to a rate of 0.16% in developed countries during the years 2000–2050… 
In the face of such growth, job opportunities may be doomed to become much 
rarer. And large numbers of unemployed, disaffected young men, who see the West 
as their enemy, provide the cannon fodder for terrorism. 
Moreover, Krieger & Meierrieks (2010, p.914) claim that terrorism as a random 
event is more likely in a larger country: “Terrorism is also positively linked to 
larger populations, but this may simply indicate that terrorism is more likely in 
more populous countries”. In general, population growth in specific regions may 
support social issues and deteriorated human behavior and, as a consequence, 
violent crime and terrorism (cf., Altman, 1975; Coccia, 2018; Curtis, 1975). Hence, 
high growth rates of population, mainly in poor and unstable regions, can increase 
socioeconomic problems and possibly give rise to more violence and terrorism 
(Cassils, 2004; Coccia, 2018a). Although many studies about causing factors of 
terrorism, the growth rate of population associated with high lethality due to 
terrorism incidents in society is unknown. Next section presents the methodology 
of the study here that endeavors to investigate and explain, whenever possible the 
growth rate of population that supports terrorism in regions with social issues.  
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3. Materials and methods 
3.1. Measures 
Demographic indicators of this studyare: 
 Annual population growth rate 1975-2002 and 2002-2015-acronym 
POPGROWTH (Norris, 2015) 
 Population ages 0-14 (% of total) for year  2006 (World Bank, 2008) 
 Economic indicators are (World Bank, 2008): 
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
international $, year 2006 
 Income Gini coefficient, year 2002: Measure of the deviation of the distribution 
of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly 
equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 
absolute inequality. 
Socioeconomic and political indicators are: 
 Human Development Index –HDI– (years 1975 and 2005) based on United 
Nations Development Programme data (cf., Norris, 2015). The HDI is a 
composite index that measures the average achievement of human development: a 
long and healthy life (life expectancy at birth), the education (mean of years of 
schooling for adults aged 25 years) and the standard of living dimension based on 
gross national income per capita (UNDP, 2016). 
 Freedom House Index of democracy (standardized value) for year 2000 (Norris, 
2015). It assigns ratings of political rights and civil liberties for each independent 
nation (electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and government 
functioning). 
 Religious fractionalization, year 2002 (cf., Norris, 2015). This index, defined by 
Alesina et al., (2003), uses the term “fractionalization” to represent the religious 
plurality of countries. Alesina et al., (2003, pp. 158ff) compute the 
fractionalization as one minus Herfindahl index of religious group shares, and 
find that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different 
groups. The formula is: FRACTj = 1−  sij
2N
i=1   where sij is the share of group i (i 
=1,…,N) in country j. It indicates a measure of fragmentation (heterogeneity) 
based on a broader classification of religious groups. 
 Kaufmann political stability, year 2006 (cf., Norris, 2015). It measures 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism.   
 Indicator of terrorist incidents for 2002-2014 period is (Global Terrorism 
Database, START, 2015): 
 Number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident. This number includes all 
victims and attackers who died as a direct result of the incident. It is the 
arithmetic mean over 2002-2014 period per country. 
 Sources of data are Democracy Cross-National Data by Norris (2015), World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2008) and Global Terrorism Database 
(START, 2015). In particular, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-
source database including information on terrorist events and incidents around the 
world (more than 140,000 cases) from 1970 to 2014.  
 
3.2. Data analysis procedure 
The total sample of the study is N=132 countries. This study also considers a 
sub-sample of N= 50 countries divided in three cultural zones to show differences 
of key indicators across geoeconomic areas (see Appendix A). Regional categories 
are given by: North America (3 countries), Western Europe (24 countries), and 
Middle East & North Africa (23 countries). The preliminary analysis is performed 
with descriptive statistics between macro regions just mentioned.  
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The main analysis of this study, based on sample of N=132 countries, applies 
bivariate correlation between population growth and confirmed fatalities from 
terroristic incidents. Moreover, these variables are analyzed with regression 
analysis and optimization methods as follows.  
Suppose that:  
a) Terrorism is a specific type of violent crime 
b) Terrorism is affected by high population 
c) Number of total confirmed fatalities for the terrorist incident is a proxy of 
lethality due to terroristic incidents in society 
This study hypothesizes a non-linear relation between terrorism and population 
growth rate to explore the possibility of quadratic effects. The goal is to understand 
if there exists a rate of population growth associated with high lethality due to 
terrorism incidents in society. The specification of the relation is that number of 
total confirmed fatalities for the terrorist incident over 2002-2014 (in natural 
logarithmic scale) is a function of annual population growth rate over 1975-2002. 
The model of regression is given by a quadratic function:  
 
tiiti
uy ,t,
2
2002)-t(1975i,22002)-t(1975i,10)20142002(, x  x log    (1) 
 
where  
yi,t= Number of total confirmed fatalities for the terrorist incident 2002-2014 
xi,t= Annual population growth rate (POPGROWTH) 1975-2002 
ui,t= Error term (country i=1, …, n; t=time) 
The square of the annual population growth rate in model [1] is introduced to 
take into account the possibility of non-linear effect between variables under study, 
as shown by some scholars for investigations about economic development (cf., 
Valli & Saccone, 2011, pp.7-9). In addition, this equation [1] suitably fits scatter 
data. 
The relation [1] is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. In 
particular, the estimated relationship [1] is an objective function of one (real) 
variable represented by a polynomial function of an order higher than the first 
order. This, the estimated Eq. [1] is a continuous and infinitely differentiable 
function; it can be analyzed by differential calculus to find the optimal rate of 
population growth associated with the highest number of total confirmed fatalities 
for the terrorist incident. Statistical analyses are performed by using the Software 
IBM Statistics SPSS version 21.0. 
 
4. Results  
Understanding where and how terrorism happens can provide vital information 
to explaining why it happens. 
In particular, terrorism cannot be understood without having accurate 
knowledge of the environmental determinants (e.g., demographic, economic, 
geographic and social factors) in which it occurs. First of all, terrorism here is 
considered a specific type of crime that leads to violent crime in society (Rice, 
2009); a proxy of the effects of this violent crime is given by number of fatalities 
for incidents of terrorist attacks. Table 1 shows the annual population growth rate 
in 1975-2002 and in 2002-2015 period considering three macro-regions: North 
America, Western Europe and Middle East. The cultural zones of Western 
countries, had over 1975-2002, an average annual population growth rate of 1.37% 
in North America and 0.89% in Western Europe, respectively versus. Middle East 
that had 3.1%. The period 2002-2015 confirms that Western countries had an 
average annual population growth rate lower than Middle East (see, Table 1, 2nd 
row). The effect of this trend on population ages 0-14 (% of total) is that Western 
Europe in 2006 had 16.66 per cent of young people (% of total), North America 
had 22.75 per cent, whereas Middle East had the highest value, 30.33 per cent of 
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total. These results indicate a population structure of young in the regions of 
Middle East. Table 1 also shows descriptive statistics of socioeconomic variables 
and total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks between macro regions. In 
short, this statistical analysis shows, in the Middle East, a high average population 
growth combined with problematic socioeconomic factors, especially poverty, low 
democracy, low HDI and political stability. Ackoff & Rovin (2003, p.146) claim 
that inequality of the distribution of wealth, low opportunities for development and 
low quality of life contribute to “the frustration and alienation that give rise to 
terrorism”. A study for the Heritage Foundation in 2002 argues that countries prone 
to terrorism are the least advantaged economically (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003, p.146). 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of some indicators across three macro regions 
 North America Western Europe Middle East&North 
Africa 
Annual population growth rate 1975-2002(1) 1.37 (0.55) 0.89   (0.8) 3.10 (1.28) 
Annual population growth rate 2002-2015(1) 0.97 (0.25) 0.55 (0.66) 1.98 (0.73) 
Population age 0-14% total, year 2006 22.75% 16.66% 30.33% 
GDP per capita PPP in U$ 2006y(2) $23,371 ($16,001.86) $25,715 ($11,104.06) $2,748 ($2.004.13) 
Gini coefficient 2002y(1) 41.80 (10.84) 31.58 (2.91) 39.44 (2.26) 
Human Development Index(1) (HDI) 1975y 0.80 (0.10) 0.81 (0.05) 0.58 (0.13) 
Human Development Index(1) (HDI) 2005y 0.91 (0.07) 0.94 (0.02)  0.78 (0.10) 
Freedom House Stand. scale 100pts 2000y(1) 92.82 (12.37) 96.58 (4.37) 34.57 (18.48) 
Religious fractionalization (1) 2002y 0.57 (0.34) 0.35 (0.20) 0.26 (0.24) 
Kaufmann political stability(1) 2006y 0.28 (0.67) 0.89 (0.40) 0.64 (1.02) 
Total Number of Fatalities from terrorist attacks 2002-2014 (3) 0.63   (2.57) 0.23   (3.07) 2.81 (13.97) 
Source (1): Norris (2015); (2): World Bank (2008); (3): START (2015).  
Note: First number of geo-economic areas is the arithmetic mean; Standard Deviation (SD) is in round 
parenthesis.  
 
Table 2.  Parametric estimates, OLS results of number of fatalities from terrorist attacks 
2002-2014 on annual population growth rate 1975-2002 
Regression Analysis Model Fit 
 Predictors 
Unstandardized  
Coefficients Sig. 
Adjusted R Square 
(Std. Error  
of the Estimate) 
F 
(Sign.) 
 
 B Std. Error    
POPGROWTH 1.01 0.250 0.001 0.16 12.141 
POPGROWTH 2 0.14 0.054 0.001 (1.32) (0.001) 
(Constant) 1.50 0.280 0.001   
Note: Dependent variable is log (Number of Fatalities from terrorist attacks 2002-2014); log has base e 
(natural logarithm) 
 
Statistical analysis also shows a coefficient of correlation of about 0.27 (p-
value<0.05) between total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks 2002-2014 and 
annual population growth rate 1975-2002 between countries. 
The geometric representation of the estimated relationship between growth rates 
of population and total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks shows an 
inverted-U curve (Figure 1). In order to determine the rate of population growth 
that supports total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks, the maximum of the 
estimated relationship is calculated as follows (cf., table 2).  
Let:  
 
tiiii uPOPGROWTHPOPGROWTHy ,20021975,
2
220021975,1020142001,log     (2) 
tiiii uPOPGROWTHPOPGROWTHy ,20021975,
2
20021975,20142001, 141.0014.150.1log  
          
(3) 
 
y= Total number of fatalities from terrorist attacks and POPGROWTH= 
average population growth (annual %) for 1975-2002. 
Let logy= k and h=POPGROWTH, the necessary condition to maximize Eq. [3] 
is:  
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
dh
dk k’(h)= 1.014–0.282h       (4) 
 
The first derivative equal to 0 is: 
 
k’(h) = 0; 1.014–0.282h=0 Max= h* = 
1.014
0.282
= 3.60%   (5) 
 
Hence a growth rate of population of about 3.6% seems to support a high 
number of fatalities from terrorist attacks (in natural log scale) between regions 
with social issues. 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Inverted-U curve fitted to countries data (concave downwards) 
 
Finally, if logy=1.15+1.014(3.6)0.141(3.6)2  (log has base e) 
logy = 0.67 
y= e0.67 = 1.95 max average total confirmed fatalities for terrorist incident over 
2002-2014. 
 
Figure 1 suggests, with empirical data, that high growth rates of population, 
combined with a high number of confirmed fatalities from terrorist incidents, are in 
Iraq, Kenia, Sudan, Mali, Liberia, Niger, etc.  
 
5. Discussion  
Why and how growth rates of population higher than 3.5% support terrorism?  
In general, high density of population has often been investigated as an 
environmental stressor since it is predicted to have a significant negative influence 
on social relations and psychological health (Baum & Paulus, 1991). Large 
numbers of people, as stressful factor, may lead to social overload and threaten 
regulation of interaction in society (Altman, 1975; Baum & Koman, 1976; Baum et 
al., 1982; Desor, 1972; Laird, 1973; Schulz-Gambard et al., 1988; Valins & Baum, 
1973). Animal studies also demonstrate large negative effects in the presence of 
high density (Christian, 1961; Calhoun, 1962; Thiessen & Rodgers, 1961). In 
particular, violent crime is strongly associated with disorganized and distressed 
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regions having high population density, high levels of economic deprivation and 
ethnic heterogeneity (cf., Christens & Speer, 2005; Cahill & Mulligan, 2003). 
Many studies indicate that a higher population density and a lower level of 
household income are associated with increased residential crime (Cahill & 
Mulligan, 2003). The positive correlation between higher population density and 
crime can be explained with the theory of association between density and poverty 
(Curtis, 1975). Sociological studies consider the perspective that high density of 
population and crowding produce mental stress and deteriorated human functioning 
that can lead to crime (Altman, 1975). Especially, environmental stressors, because 
of unfavorable socioeconomic and demographic conditions, can generate cultural 
deviance and behavioral problems (Lepore et al., 1991; Regoeczi, 2003). Studies 
reveal that frustration generated by high levels of population density can stimulate 
aggression and violent behavior between individuals (Mackintosh et al., 1975; 
Regoeczi, 2003). As a matter of fact, frustration may increase in response to 
decreasing environmental resources due to high population density (Altman, 1975; 
Verbrugge & Taylor, 1980). Hence, high density of population can increase levels 
of environmental aversion conducive to violent crime (Cahill & Mulligan, 2003, 
p.585). In addition, high growth rates of population modify the demographic 
structure of nations, increasing the younger age classes. The age composition of 
population, interacting with poverty and other socioeconomic factors, is a 
neglected factor for terrorism studies (cf., Ehrlich & Liu, 2002). Instead, regions 
with young population can have high human resources and low economic 
resources, generating a population pressure (population-resource imbalance). The 
increasing young age category of individuals, combined with poverty (cf., 
“blockage of goal-seeking behavior”, Agnew, 1985, passim) is often evoked as the 
source of stress in society that leads to aversive environments, violence and 
terrorism as a result (cf., van Bergen et al., 2015). Ehrlich & Liu (2002, p.187) 
argue that the vast majority of terrorists were young adult males: “Based on the 
information from the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list… approximately 90% of 
those on the list were all males and from 22 to 34 years old when their first alleged 
terrorist act took place”. These students or young professionals may be 
disillusioned with the prospects of changing society and see little chance of access 
to the system despite their privileged status (Crenshaw, 1981, p.384). In general, 
the prevalence of young population in poor socioeconomic environments can 
induce collective and/or personal deprivation, social exclusion that lead to 
frustrated and angry individuals using violence (cf., van Bergen et al., 2015). In 
particular, the source of terrorism can be also due to increasing young individuals 
in the presence of problematic socioeconomic environments and connectedness to 
mainstream society that become frustrated and anger and may turn to terrorism as 
a result (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003; Rice, 2009). Moreover, within rich countries, 
many terrorists today are also young, well-educated, and middle class in 
background (Butler, 2015). Overall, than, high growth rates of population are basic 
factors to reinforce aversive environment and intergroup hostility leading to violent 
crime and terrorism in society (cf., Cahill & Mulligan, 2003; Choma et al., 2016; 
Christens & Speer, 2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Regoeczi, 2003¸ Rice, 2009; 
Schaafsma & Williams, 2012; van Bergen et al., 2015).  
 
6. Concluding observations 
Terrorism is expected to increase in the future, though rising economic growth, 
higher investments in R&D and the vital role of research labs that support 
technology transfer and enforcement technologies to reduce and/or prevent this 
social issue (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003; United Nations, 2016). In fact, The literature 
shows that manifold factors affect terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Coggins, 2015; 
Enders et al., 2016; Schaafsma & Williams, 2012). Piazza (2006) argues that a 
popular hypothesis is that terrorism and other forms of political violence are due to 
poverty and poor distribution of economic resources as “expression of 
Journal of Economics Bibliography 
JEB, 5(3), M. Coccia, p.142-158. 
150 
socioeconomic discontent and desperation” (Piazza, 2006, p. 160). The UN 
General Assembly claimed that the crisis of international terrorism can be due to 
issues of poverty, inequality, underdevelopment and the absence of social justice in 
the developing world (United Nations, 2016). Terrorist organizations can use poor 
socioeconomic conditions of people as a base to support their criminal activities 
(cf., Enders & Hoover, 2012; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010). As a matter of fact, low 
levels of socioeconomic development increase the appeal of political extremism, 
encourage political violence and instability in society (Piazza, 2006).  
However, in the field of terrorism, convincing studies that explain the 
relationship between demographic factor and terrorism are scarce. In particular, 
many studies do not explain the precise level of population growth leading to 
terrorism, and a number of important factors linked to terrorism and population in 
problematic regions has been largely ignored, such as age composition of 
population, religious fractionalization, political stability of countries, etc.  
The statistical evidence above seems in general to support the hypothesis that a 
high lethality due to terrorist incidents in society can be explained by growth rates 
of population higher than 3.5%, combined with poverty and political instability, 
other things being equal. As a matter of fact, the ethnicity and/or religion are 
illusory causes of terrorism, because they are not an environmental stressor per se, 
whereas a basic determinant of terrorism may be a critical demographic mass that, 
in certain environments with problematic socioeconomic factors, leads to disrupt 
the stability of societies/communities, and to increase frustration and anger of 
people, generating terrorism as a result (cf., Butler, 2015).  
The findings here can clarify, as far as possible, some important features of 
terrorism, such as: 
(1) The theoretical framework assigns a central role to high growth rate of 
population to explain general causes of terrorism. 
(2) This study shows that terrorism seems to be fueled with growth rates of 
population higher than 3.5%, combined with poverty, political instability, etc., 
other things being equal. 
(3) The theoretical framework and evidence here are also able to explain that 
terrorism originates in certain aversive environments with high growth rates of 
population that can generate cultural deviance, frustration and anger of young 
individuals, and terrorism as a result. 
(4) A consequence of the study here is that low growth rates of population, 
combined with high standard of living for young generations, are not likely to 
produce terrorism. 
(5) Another consequence of the study here is that current trend of high growth 
rates of population in regions (and communities) with social issues can continue to 
feed terrorism and terroristic threat for many years to come. 
Since terrorism can arise out of an inability to cope effectively with aversive 
environments, there is a clear need to focus on a long-run strategy of economic aid 
for a conflict dissolution of this critical problem in society: “means to redesign 
either the society that has the problem or its environment in such way as to 
eliminate the problems or the conditions that caused it” (Ackoff & Rovin, 2003, 
p.10). Currently, deterrence policy, preventive actions, imposing sanctions on 
actual and presumptive terrorist countries, cut off national financing, etc. have 
short-term effects and do not reduce the social issues of terrorism in the long run. 
Ackoff & Rovin (2003, p.145) argue that: “containment and isolation of terrorists 
have not been particularly effective because they do not weaken the terrorists’ 
beliefs… sanctions imposed on such societies do not reduce their resolve”. Other 
counter-terrorism strategies remove regimes that sponsor terrorists and/or use 
military actions but they can generate instability of target nations and unknown 
social effects. Linstone (2003, p.292) states that: “military means to pre-empt the 
terrorists or root them out can reduce, but not eliminate, the terrorist threat. Indeed, 
it may actually increase it by radicalizing many young” (cf., Editorials Nature, 
2015).  
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Considering the problematic demographic and socioeconomic factors of 
terrorism discussed here, a policy to reduce the terrorism from nations that are its 
principal sources can require a program of economic aid to reduce economic 
inequality, increase standard of living and work opportunities in society (cf., 
Ehrlich & Liu, 2002; Ackoff & Rovin, 2003; Frey & Luechinger, 2003). The aim is 
to provide education and economic opportunity to young population reducing 
environmental stress and unemployment (cf., Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010). This 
economic policysupporting wealth, wellbeing and goal-seeking behavior of 
people in populated regionscan reduce environmental aversion, frustration and 
anger of young individuals and, likely, one of the principal sources of terrorism 
(cf., Agnew, 1985; Rice, 2009). Hence, the rising economic prosperity of 
problematic regions may help to lower economic and demographic causes of 
terrorism in society. In fact, Krieger and Meierrieks (2010, p.902) confirm that 
social policies ameliorate short-run and long-run socioeconomic conditions of poor 
areas within and between countries (e.g., unemployment, poverty, inequality, and 
dissatisfaction), and indirectly reduce terrorism. In short, terrorism in societies with 
high growth rates of population and socioeconomic problems can also be fought by 
developmental programs to support education and work opportunity that raise 
economic prosperity. In fact, more generous welfare regimes may help both to 
lower short-run sources of collective deviance and frustration in society, and to 
lower long-run inequality, poverty and population growth that set the stage for 
terrorism.  
Overall, then, the findings of the study can clarify whenever possible, one of 
principal sources of terrorism in society. However, the study here, based on a 
partial model, did not permit some intervening variables that may have been useful 
in providing a deeper and richer explanation of these social issues. To conclude, the 
results here are of course tentative since we know that situational factors causing 
terrorism are often not equal over time and space. This study here investigates 
specific demographic factors that are important but not sufficient determinants to 
understand the comprehensive reasons for and the general implications of terrorism 
in modern society. There is need for much more detailed research into the relations 
between terrorism, population and economic factors of nations to explain manifold 
factors of this critical social issue in current and maybe future societies.  
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Appendix  
Appendix A. Countries  
North America: Canada, Mexico, United States.   
Western Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City, Germany.  
Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen.  
 
Appendix B. 
 
 
Figure 1B.  
Boxplot of variables with outliers (United Arab Emirates, Italy, Ireland and Greece) 
 
Table 1B. Descriptive key statistics 
  
Annual 
population 
growth rate 
1975-2002 
Total Number of 
Fatalities from 
terrorist attacks 
2002-2014 
LN 
Annual 
population growth 
rate 1975-2002 
LN 
Total Number of 
Fatalities from 
terrorist attacks 
2002-2014 
Mean 1.92 2.20 0.38 0.10 
Std. Deviation 1.21 3.24 0.96 1.44 
Skewness 0.19 2.74 -1.31 -0.60 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Kurtosis 0.48 8.60 0.74 0.41 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 
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